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COMMENTS Iz5
The question as to when an act is discretionary rather than ministerial,
or an absolute duty,3 4 can be answered only by examination of the applica-
ble statutes and the particular facts of each case. 35 Although the exact
limits of the "discretionary function or duty" exception are as yet un-
charted by the courts, the cases indicate that the courts are aware of the
manifest intent of Congress to pay for the negligent performance of rou-
tine duties by federal employees, but just as importantly not to inhibit the
action of employees exercising genuine executive discretion and responsi-
bility, and the courts are determined to carry out that intent.
MORALITY UNDER NATURALIZATION AND
IMMIGRATION ACTS
Few topics have caused more consternation and discussion throughout
the history of man than the problem of right and wrong. Legal scholars
and commentators have been in the thick of this controversy. The question
was highlighted by Chief Justice Vinson of the United States Supreme
Court, when in a recent case he stated: "Nothing is more certain in modern
society than the principle that there are no absolutes."' This theory might
evoke surprise among lay people, but it should be no stranger to lawyers. 2
Such a view, far from being an idle bit of philosophical by-play,3 has a
direct and vital effect upon two of the most important pieces of federal
legislation: the Naturalization Act and the Immigration Act.
The Naturalization Act makes one desiring to become a citizen prove
that he has been "a person of good moral character" during the five years
a
4 Costley v. United States, 181 F. zd 723 (C.A. 5 th, 195o); State of Maryland v.
Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., 176 F. 2d 414 (C.A. 4th, 1949) (F.H.A. had absolute,
not discretionary, duty to safeguard health of tenants); Oman v. United States, 179 F.
2d 738 (C.A. ioth, 1949). (No government employee is granted the discretion to
induce third parties to interfere with exclusive grazing privileges granted by the
United States.)
35 E.g., Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa, 1949)
(Secretary of the Interior took over operation of a coal mine under an Executive
Order empowering him to run it in such manner as he deemed necessary in the
interest of the war effort. Held, that the power was discretionary).
1 Dennis et al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
2 "It is no longer news that law has lost its connection with philosophy. In place
of its traditional foundations of morals and metaphysics it now rests either on some
pragmatic expendiency or on an historic evolution evidenced by custom, or it is
deemed to consist of nothing but facts and therefore rests on no basis at all."
McKinnon, Law and Philosophy, z6 Can. Bar Rev. 1045 (1948).
s "We have arrived at the point historically where we can no longer proceed with
any health or happiness on the blithe assumption that it doesn't matter what any of
us believe-or whether there is really anything to believe." This quotation is from
a speech delivered by Henry R. Luce, editor-in-chief of Time, Life and Fortune
magazines, at the opening of Southern Methodist University's new legal center. A full
text of the speech can be found in 43 Fortune, No. 6, at 85 (June, 195).
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preccding his application for citizenship. 4 This requirement has been a part
of our naturalization procedure since i8oz.5 The phrase itself has varied
in meaning over the past 15o years. Traditionally, the mere violation of a
statute, regardless of its character, indicated bad moral character.6 As a re-
suit, cases have held that those who gave false statements to naturalization
exai lncrs, 7 violated the National Prohibition Act,8 and violated local liquor
laws!' could not be naturalized. A single act of adultery was once a fatal
flaw in the petitioner's character.10 In another case, the court denied the
petition of one who had admitted the commission of a murder and had
served his sentence a long period of years prior to his application, even
though good conduct was proved during the five years preceding his appli-
cation.'
The courts gradually came to realize that defining morality by reference
to statutes was too contrived a solution. Exceptions began to appear, one
case finding a distinction between acts criminal in all countries and at all
times, ,and those made criminal by economic policies of a particular coun-
trV.'2 A more common method of tempering the traditional view was to
allow naturalization if the petitioner acted in good faith. Thus, one who
remarried after obtaining a rabbinical divorce was granted citizenship
where the evidence showed that the applicant was unaware that a civil
divorce was required.1 3 In another case, the petitioner entered into a mar-
riage ceremony which he believed to be valid but which in fact was not,
and lie thereafter lived in an adulterous relation with his supposed wife.
The court granted citizenship because the applicant acted in good faith.14
One undoubted advantage of the old rule has been the compilation of a
reasonably stable body of law. Thus, it may be said with some degree of
certainty that the commission of such acts as perjury,1 5 giving false state-
1 34 Stat. 598 (19o6), 8 U.S.C.A. § 707(a) (3) (1942).
• Persichctti. Good Moral Character as a Requirement for Naturalization, 22 Temp.
L.Q. 182 (1948).
01,, re Spenser, z2 Fed. Cas. 921, No. 13, 234 (C.C. Ore., 1813).
7 In re Talarico, 197 Fed. io9 (AvV.D. Pa., 1912); In re Conway, 9 N.Y. Misc. 652,
3o N.Y. Supp. 835 (S. Ct., 1894).
8 In re Bonner, 279 Fed. 789 (Mont., 1922).
9 United States v. Gerstein, 284 Ill. 174, 119 N.E. 922 (1918); United States v.
H1rashy, 240 II1. 56o, 88 N.E. 1031 (1909).
10 United States v. Unger, 26 F. 2d i 14 (S.D. N.Y., 1928); United States v. Wexler,
8 F. 2d 88o (E.D. N.Y., 1925).
11 In re Ross, 188 Fed. 685 (C.C. Pa., 1911).
12 In re Bookschnis, 61 F. Stipp. 751 (Ore.. 1945).
1:3 petition of Schl1an, 41 F. Supp. 161 (S.D. N.Y., 1941), rev'd on other grounds
136 F. 2d 480 (C.A. 2d. '943).
14 Application of Barug, 76 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal.. 1948). Note cases footnoted
therein.
'5 Case cited note 6 supra.
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ments to naturalization examiners, 16 cruel and barbarous treatment, 7 and
homicide 18 indicate a lack of good moral character.
Recent cases evidence a break with the traditional view that statutes are
the criterion of good moral character, although the break has not been
complete. 10 Today good moral character is such character as measures up
to the standards of the community in which the alien resides. 20 As might
be expected, this rule has had an unstabilizing effect on the cases, particu-
larly those dealing with family and sexual relations. Where one act of
adultery once barred citizenship, recent cases have allowed naturalization
where the relationship was long-term, open and notorious. 21 Fornication
has given the courts considerable trouble. Decided cases indicate that forni-
cation does not destroy good moral character.22 But the question is still
unsettled, as is indicated by a recent federal case in which the court was
equally divided on the problem.23
A case in which Judge Learned Hand wrote the opinion is a most striking
example of the cleavage between the traditional statutory standard and the
current moral convention rule. 24 In that decision, the petitioner was tried
and convicted for the mercy killing of his hopelessly crippled son. Sentence
was suspended, however. This conviction was relied upon by the govern-
ment as evidence that the petitioner lacked good moral character. Judge
Hand agreed, not because the applicant had violated a statute declaring
his act to be murder, but because euthanasia, in the court's opinion, would
shock the conscience of the community, and so was not in accord with
current moral conventions.
This latest formula for judging good moral character is not without its
critics. Chief among them is Judge Learned Hand himself, who has said
that judges have been given an impossible task in determining current moral
conventions.25 The best thing they can do, says the judge, is to take a guess.
16 Del Guercio v. Pupko, i6o F. 2d 799 (C.A. 9 th, 1947); Petition of Ledo, 67 F.
Supp. 917 (R.I., 1946); cases cited note 7 supra.
17 Application of Polivka, 3o F. Supp. 67 (WV.D. Pa., 1939).
18 In re Caroni, 13 F. 2d 954 (N.D. Cal., 1926); In re Ross, 188 Fed. 685 (C.C. Pa.,
1911).
91In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal., 1943)-
20 United States v. Cloutier, 87 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich., 1949); Petition of Gani,
86 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. La., 1949); Petition of De Leo, 75 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa.,
1948).
21 Petition of Rudder, 159 F. 2d 695 (C.A. ad, 1947); Petition of R--, 56 F. Supp.
969 (Mass., 1944); United States v. Rubia, 1 io F. 2d 92 (C.A. 5th, 194o).
22 Application of Murra, 178 F. 2d 670 (C.A. 7th, 1949); Schmidt v. United States,
177 F. 2d 450 (C.A. ad, 1949).
23 United States v. Manfredi, 168 F. -d 752 (C.A. 3d, 1948), in which an unmarried
man admitted that he had had occasional meretricious relationships with a single
woman for pay.
24 Repouille v. United States, 165 F. 2d 152 (C.A. 2d, 1947).
25Johnson v. United States, i86 F. zd 588 (C.A. 2d, 195).
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Another problem plaguing the courts in these cases is to decide whether
petitioner's conduct prior to the five year span preceding his application
is open to inspection. Cases have gone both ways. 20 It seems clear that the
applicant must not be guilty of bad moral conduct from the time his appli-
cation is filed until the hearing.27
The problem of judicially determining morality is further complicated
by another statute dealing with aliens. That is the Immigration Act which
allows the Attorney General to deport an alien who is convicted of or
admits commission of a "crime involving moral turpitude." 28 A widely
accepted definition of moral turpitude is: "an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow
men or to society in general.129 This statement has not been too helpful,
however, and the courts have been forced to find a more stable rule. One
test used was the familiar malum in se-malum prohibitum classification."0
Some have proposed that seriousness of the crime be the criterion;31 others
would limit the words moral turpitude to crimes of violence.3 2 These tests
have largely been abandoned, until now the most popular standard seems
to be the same as that for judging good moral character, i.e., current moral
conventions. 33
Despite the different tests used to decide moral turpitude cases, a certain
amount of uniformity is noticeable. This may be due to the fact that in
applying the moral turpitude phrase of the Immigration Act, the court can
only consider if the crime committed, of its nature, involves moral turpi-
tude.34 The petitioner's guilt or innocence cannot be considered, nor are
extrinsic facts, such as good faith, pertinent. This has a very substantial
stabilizing effect, and one which the courts do not meet in applying the
good moral character provision of the Naturalization Act. Generally speak-
28 Petition of Gabin, 6o F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Cal., 1945), in which the court said it
was not restricted in its inquiry to the five year period. Application of Murra, 178 F.
2d 670, (C.A. 7th, 1950), in which the court refused to consider evidence of petitioner's
conduct prior to the five year period.
27 In re Markiewicz, 90 F. Supp. igi (W.D. Pa., 195o).
28 39 Stat. 889 (r917), 8 U.S.C.A. S 155(a) (1942).
29Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F. 2d 755 (C.A. 7th, 193).
30 United States ex tel. Chartrand v. Karnuth, 31 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. N.Y., i94o);
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 236 (951). dissenting opinion.
31 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 236 (1951), dissenting opinion.
32 Ibid.
33 United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa., 1947);
United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Mo., 1939); United States ex tel.
Iorio v. Day, 34 F. 2d 920 (C.A. 2d, 1929); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 236
(195), dissenting opinion.
34 United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F. zd iozz (C.A. zd, 1931).
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ing, the following crimes involve moral turpitude: rape,3 5 bigamy,36 adul-
tery,37 assault with a dangerous weapon,38 grand and petit larceny,39 man-
slaughter in advanced degrees, 40 forgery,41 embezzlement, 42 and counter-
feiting. 43
A great deal of trouble is encountered when tax laws are under scrutiny.
A leading case on the subject is Jordan v. De George.44 There the petitioner
conspired to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits. The
majority of the court, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, thought
that any crime wherein fraud was an ingredient involved moral turpitude.
A strong dissent was lodged by Justices Jackson, Black and Frankfurter,
who said that the phrase "moral turpitude" was too vague a standard to be
constitutional. In a significant statement, the dissenters said: "Can we ac-
cept 'the moral standards that prevail in contemporary society' as a suffi-
ciently definite standard for the purposes of the Act? ... How should we
ascertain the moral sentiments of masses of persons on any better basis than
a guess?" 45
It seems proper to ask whether the courts are correct in their basic
assumption that morality is a variable, unstable concept, one which receives
its validity from the majority view of those in a particular locality. There
was a time when morality meant something vastly different than it does
to most courts today. The belief that there exists an unchanging, ascertain-
able standard of conduct to which all human actions should be in accord
has been voiced by some of the greatest philosophers in history, men like
Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Locke, Rousseau and Kant.46
Blackstone, one of the eminent scholars of Anglo-American law, was
a firm believer in absolutes. 47 In i776, the framers of the Declaration of
Independence gave eloquent voice to their deep-rooted conviction that
35 Case cited note 29 supra.
86 Whitty v. Weedin, 68 F. 2d 127 (C.A. 9 th, 1933).
87 United States ex rel. Tourny v. Reimer, 8 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. N.Y., 1934).
38 United States ex rel. Pellegrino v. Karnuth, 23 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. N.Y., 1938);
United States v. Smith, 8 F. 2d 663 (W.D. N.Y., 1975).
39 United States ex rel. Chartrand v. Karnuth, 31 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. N.Y., 194o);
United States ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 54 F. 2d 336 (C.A. 2d, 1931).
40United States ex rel. Sollano v. Doak, 68 F. ad 1O9 (C.A. 2d, 1933); Pillisz v.
Smith, 46 F. zd 769 (C.A. 7 th, 1931).
41 Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736 (Mass., 1934).
42 United States ex rel. Schreiber v. Reimer, 19 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. N.Y., 1937).
43 United States ex rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordan, 164 F. zd 633 (C.A. 7th, 1947).
44 341 U.S. 223 (951).
45 Ibid., at 237.
46 Adler, The Doctrine of Natural Law in Philosophy, 1 Natural Law Institute
Proceedings 66 (1947).
47 1 Bl. Comm. *39, 40.
130 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
there were unchangeable ideals which had a more stable foundation than
the shifting sands of public opinion.48
Contemporary legal scholars such as Mortimer Adler, 49 Harold Mc-
Kinnon, ° Ben Palmer 5 and Clarence Manion 52 have expressed belief in
ultimate truth. They are the foremost advocates of the only contemporary
school of jurisprudence which is founded upon a belief in absolutes. This
philosophy is generally referred to as Natural Law.53
It will be seen that competent authority exists for maintaining that
morality is an unchanging, absolute, ascertainable standard of conduct. If
such a rule were to be applied to concrete cases, would the maze of con-
tradictory decisions in this field disappear? No one can say for sure. If a
constitutional phrase like "freedom of speech" is subject to so much doubt
and dispute, it cannot be hoped that a God-given directive to do good and
avoid evil54 will cause any less consternation. Nevertheless, such broad
standards are at least a foothold55 upon which men of intelligence and
goodwill can build a reasonably stable body of law.
EXTENSION OF LIABILITY OF STOREKEEPERS TO
THOSE RIGHTFULLY UPON THE PREMISES
Sometimes when examining a rule of law which has remained stable for a
number of years one finds that, although the rule has remained the same
in its expression, a change has occurred in it application. Such a change
seems to have taken place in the cases dealing with the liability of store-
keepers and proprietors of shops to those rightfully upon their premises.
48 Declaration of Independence, Preamble.
40 Authority cited note 46 supra, at 65.
50 Authority cited note 2 supra.
' Palmer, Reply to Mr. Charles W. Briggs, 3z A.B.A.J. 635 (1946).
52 Manion, The Founding Fathers and the Natural Law: A Study of the Source
of Our Legal Institutions, 35 A.B.A.J. 461 (1949).
3 'ln the beginning God, acting with Supreme Intelligence, created all things
according to a Divine Plan. That Plan is the Eternal Law. Man, endowed by his
Creator with an immortal soul, an intellect and a free will, can ascertain the primary
dictates of the Eternal Law by his own reason, apart from direct Revelation. Such
dictates thus made known, together with the inferences flowing rationally from them,
constitute the Natural Law." 3 Natural Law Institute (1949).
54 Authority cited note 46 supra, at 71.
55 The problem of deciding just what the moral law prohibits is not too great an
obstacle. Authority cited note 51 supra, at 636; Wilkin, Natural Law in American
Jurisprudence, 224 Notre Dame Lawyer 343, 361 (1949). Already tax statutes have
been examined in the light of Natural Law. Peters, Tax Law and Natural Law,
26 Notre Dame Lawyer 29 (195o). Other perplexing problems have been treated
also. Rommen. The Natural Law, c. XII (1948); Cobban, The Crisis of Civilization,
c. X (1941); Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (1947); Sterilization,
33 Marq. I.. Rev. 78 (1949); Euthanasia, 33 Marq. L. Rev. 133 ('949); Divorce,
32 Marq. L. Rev. 295 ('949).
